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Abstract.1  Over the past years, scholars have increasingly debated 
over the reasons why we should, or should not, deploy specimens 
of AI technology, such as robots, on the battlefields, in the market, 
or at our homes. Amongst the moral theories that discuss what is 
right, or what is wrong, about a robot’s behaviour, virtue ethics, 
rather than utilitarianism and deontologism, offers a fruitful 
approach to the debate. The context sensitivity and bottom-up 
methodology of virtue ethics fits like hand to glove with the 
unpredictability of robotic behaviour, for it involves a trial-and-
error learning of what makes the behaviour of that robot good, or 
bad. However, even advocates of virtue ethics admit the limits of 
their approach: All in all, the more societies become complex, the 
less shared virtues are effective, the more we need rules on rights 
and duties. By reversing the Kantian idea that a nation of devils can 
establish a state of good citizens, if they “have understanding,” we 
can say that even a nation of angels would need the law in order to 
further their coordination and collaboration. Accordingly, the aim 
of this paper is not only to show that a set of perfect moral agents, 
namely a bunch of angelic robots, need rules. Also, no single moral 
theory can instruct us as to how to legally bind our artificial agents 
through AI research and robotic programming. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past years the debate on “roboethics” [1, 2], and the legal 
aspects of robotics [3, 4], has been particularly popular among 
scholars. As to the technology under scrutiny, some argue that 
robots are machines basically built upon today’s “sense-think-act” 
paradigm in AI research [5]. Others, as Sebastian Thrun, reckon 
that robots have to do with the ability of a machine to “perceive 
something complex and make appropriate decisions” out there [in 
6, at 77]. While some others stress that robots should be able to 
learn and adapt to the changes of the environment, it is important to 
stress that robots are not a mere “out of the box” machine. As a sort 
of prolonged epigenetic developmental process, robots 
progressively gain knowledge or skills from their own interaction 
with the living beings inhabiting the surrounding environment, so 
that more complex cognitive structures emerge in the state-
transition system of the artificial agent. In addition, robots can 
respond to stimuli by changing the values of their properties or 
inner states and, furthermore, they can improve the rules through 
which those properties change without external stimuli. As a result, 
we are progressively dealing with agents, rather than simple tools 
of human interaction. Specimens of the same model will behave in 
quite different ways, according to the complexity of the context 
and how humans train, treat, or manage their robots. Both the 
behaviour and decisions of these artificial agents can thus be 
unpredictable and risky, hence giving rise to several normative 
issues. 
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As to the ethical and legal sides of robotics, there is an ever 
lasting discussion about their connection. At times, moral theories 
and the law simply cover different domains, or types of problem. 
Legal cases of faultless liability in extra-contractual obligations 
illustrate this point vis-à-vis the claim of virtue-ethicists that define 
notions of obligation, prohibition, or permission, in light of what 
makes life good, or bad. Most of what is morally crucial for virtue 
ethics is not relevant from a legal point of view: we return to this 
relation below in Section 3. However, contrary to current advocates 
of “exclusive legal positivism,” we may admit that, now and then, 
moral theories guide the law. Consider cases of general 
disagreement that regard either the meaning of the terms framing 
the legal question, or the ways such terms are related to each other 
in legal reasoning, or the role of the principles that are at stake in 
the case. As suggested by Ronald Dworkin and his followers, an 
option for tackling such hard cases is given by the “uniquely right 
answer”-thesis. According to this stance, a morally coherent 
narrative should grasp the law in such a way that, given the nature 
of the legal question and the story and background of the issue, 
scholars can attain the answer that best justifies or achieves the 
integrity of the law [7]. By identifying the principles of the system 
that fit with the established law, jurists could apply such principles 
in a way that presents the case in the best possible light.  
Alternatively, some other scholars represent the hard cases of 
the law as a class of cases that confront us with something new and 
moreover, that require a reasonable compromise between many 
conflicting interests. Although this is of course the stance Herbert 
Hart made popular with his work [8], it does not follow that we 
have to buy any of his theoretical assumptions on, for example, the 
rule of recognition and the minimum content of natural law, to 
concede that a reasonable compromise has at times to be found in 
the legal domain. As previous international agreements have 
regulated technological advancements over the past decades in 
such fields as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, or the 
field of computer crimes since the early 2000s, many claim that a 
new agreement on some of today’s fields of robotics, such as robot 
soldiers, is necessary [9]. Regardless of the solution to the meta-
disagreement on the hard cases of the law, we thus have cases in 
which the law needs the contribution of moral theories and a set of 
moral values, in order to define obligations, prohibitions, and 
permissions, via national statutes and international agreements, 
such as the Budapest Convention on computer crimes.  
The stance of this paper on robots, ethics, and the law aims to 
explore a further kind of interaction between law and ethics. The 
attention is drawn here to cases in which moral theories need the 
contribution of the law. We may assume the ideal scenario of 
scholars that agree on what is right and what is wrong, what is 
good and what is bad, about a robot’s behaviour, from an ethical 
point of view, and still two sets of legal issues are fated to remain 
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open. By reversing the Kantian idea that a nation of devils can 
establish a state of good citizens, if they “have understanding” [10, 
at 366], we can say that even a nation of angels need some rules to 
further their coordination and collaboration. These rules may be 
interpreted either as moral norms [11], or in the sense of Hart’s 
“secondary” legal rules, i.e. rules that allow the creation, 
modification, and suppression of the “primary rules” that govern 
people’s conduct [8]. The thesis of this paper is not only that a set 
of perfect moral agents, namely a bunch of angelic robots, would 
need secondary legal rules to be good “citizens.” In addition, no 
single moral theory can instruct us as to how we should legally 
bind our robots. In order to argue these theses, the paper is divided 
into four sections. 
Next, in Section 2, attention is drawn to the debate on 
roboethics so as to appreciate the complexity of today’s state-of-
the-art. More particularly, in Section 3, the focus is on virtue ethics 
and how the context-sensitivity of this approach, together with its 
bottom-up methodology, fit like hand to glove with a pragmatic, 
legal approach to robotics. Section 4 illustrates two reasons why 
moral theories and current debate on roboethics need the support of 
the law. Section 4.1 scrutinizes a new generation of robotic crimes 
that will affect a basic tenet of the rule of law and of its continental 
European counterpart, the principle of legality, i.e. “no crime, nor 
punishment without a criminal law.” Section 4.2 dwells on the 
creation of special, i.e. legally deregulated zones, that should allow 
us to test unpredictable and risky robots in open environments. The 
conclusions of the paper insist on how the law may help us better 
understand risks and threats brought on by possible losses of 
control of AI systems, and keep them in check. If we are fated to 
face some of the criminal actions sketched below in the following 
sections, such as e.g. the “perpetration-by-another” liability model 
reversed, let us address these scenarios, first, in a living lab. 
2 ROBOETHICS TODAY 
Scholars have increasingly discussed over the reasons why we 
should, or should not, deploy robots on the battlefields, in the 
market, or at our homes. Consider current debate on whether lethal 
force can be fully automated, or whether the intent to create robots 
that people bond with is ethically justifiable. In business law, 
robotic applications trading in auction markets have brought on 
new moral and legal dilemmas. The random-bidding strategy of 
these apps clarifies, or even has provoked, real life bubbles and 
crisis, e.g. the financial troubles of late 2009 that may have been 
triggered by the involvement of such artificial agents. In this 
context, suffice it to sum up the debate on “roboethics,” or “moral 
machines” [12], in accordance with a twofold stance.  
On the one hand, as to the strict ethical side of current 
discussions in the field, we should distinguish meta-ethics, applied 
ethics, and moral theories, such as deontologism, utilitarianism, or 
virtue ethics. In the field of meta-ethics, the intent is to clarify the 
basic concepts of the subject-matter, such as notions of right and 
wrong. In the field of applied ethics, scholars deal with a set of 
moral dilemmas arising from a specific domain, e.g. robotics. In 
the field of moral theories, what is at stake concerns the different 
ways in which we can grasp and define notions of obligation, 
prohibition, permission, and the like. Correspondingly, in the case 
of moral theories, a utilitarian would judge the action or behaviour 
of robots in light of their outcomes; a deontologist in connection 
with the intent behind such an action; a virtue-ethicist in light of 
what makes life good, or bad. 
On the other hand, as to the technical side of the debate, there 
are multiple ways in which we can program our robots. This 
differentiation, of course, depends on the kind of moral theory we 
follow. However, once we agree on the content of an ethical code 
under a given moral theory, we can set up our robots either using 
deontic logic, or endorsing “principlism” and a theory of prima 
facie duties, or the “divine-command logic,” and so forth [13]. In 
the case of deontic logic, the aim is to directly formalize and 
implement an ethical code in terms of what is obligatory, 
permissible, or forbidden, through an “AI-friendly”-semantics [14], 
and a corresponding axiomatization [15]. From the point of view of 
principlism, the attention is drawn to such notions as autonomy, 
beneficence, and the aim at doing no harm, in order to infer sets of 
consistent ethical rules through computational inductive logic [16]. 
In the case of divine-command logic, the goal is the ethical control 
of robotic behaviour, drawing on both the “logic of requirement” 
[17, 18], and modal logic [19]. 
In light of this panoply of approaches, both ethical and 
technical, we should not miss a crucial point. Regardless of today’s 
discussions in legal theory, e.g. exclusive vs. inclusive legal 
positivism, it seems fair to affirm that moral theories often fall 
short in coping with the complexity of the legal phenomenon. 
Consider consequentialism, or a utilitarian stance, according to 
which actions, or behaviours, are judged in light of their outcomes. 
There are many cases in which, vice versa, “intentions” play a 
crucial role in the law: think of the intentional misuse of power and 
the reasons why a certain person committed a criminal offense, so 
as to evaluate the actus reus; the right intention of the proper 
authority entering into war; the intentions of the parties to a 
contract, or the wrongful intention that severs the link between 
claims of extra-contractual liability, i.e. the case of intentional torts 
as opposed to negligence-based responsibility and strict liability. 
Although we may aim to design a perfect consequentialist robot, 
this utilitarian approach would not prevent cases of liability for the 
behaviour of others in both criminal and civil law, that depend on 
the “intentions” of the robot.  
Against this legal backdrop, some reckon that certain robots 
can grasp the legal terms of their behaviour and, moreover, humans 
could blame such machines when they do not keep their own word 
or when they commit some kind of offense [20, 21, 22]. Others 
affirm that we should be allowed to expect that a robot really 
means what it declares when making a contractual offer [23]. In 
any event, by examining, pace advocates of consequentialism, the 
intentions of robots, this level of abstraction deepens our 
understanding of, say, the good faith of humans, rather than the 
robots’ ability to really understand what they are doing. Leaving 
aside the field of criminal law, to which we return below in Section 
4.1, contemplate today’s “contract problem” in robotics [2, 21]. 
Here, individuals should be held responsible for the erratic 
behaviour of robots, by referring the intentions of such machines to 
existing conventions of business and civil law, e.g. the “objective 
intention” of a contract. In this latter case, humans should not be 
able to avoid the usual consequence of robots making a decisive 
mistake, i.e. the annulment of a contract, when the counterparty 
had to have been aware of a mistake that due to the erratic 
behaviour of the robot, clearly concerned key elements of the 
agreement, such as the market price of the item or the substance of 
the subject-matter of that contract. Kant would agree on that. 
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But, reflect now on how deontologism in moral theory should 
address cases in which the law imposes liability regardless of the 
person’s intentions. In addition to individuals’ responsibility for the 
behaviour of their animals and, in most legal systems, their 
children, this type of faultless liability applies to most producers 
and users of robots. By following, e.g., Kant’s theory of ethics, the 
aim of design should be the program of a perfect deontologist 
robot, so that its intentions, i.e. such cognitive states as beliefs, 
desires, or hopes of the artificial agent, can always be deemed as 
appropriate. Still, this sort of Kantian robot would not prevent the 
liability of its “human master,” i.e. the latter’s strict responsibility 
in cases where scholars more frequently liken robots to animals 
[24, 25, 26], rather than products and things. The economic 
rationale for this legal regime is that strict liability rules represent 
the best method of accident control by scaling back dangerous 
activities [27]. From this latter point of view, a Kantian robot, 
designed in accordance with the tenets of deontologism, would not 
be a good legal agent at all. Some times, the law does not pay any 
attention to intentions. 
Yet, after the “consequentialist robot” and the “deontologist 
robot,” there is a further way to conceive and design our artificial 
agents, i.e. according to the tenets of virtue ethics. The context 
sensitivity and bottom-up approach of the latter seems particularly 
appropriate to tackle the unpredictability and risks of robotic 
behaviour. As Keith Abney affirms in Robotics, Ethical Theory, 
and Metaethics, virtue ethics, rather than consequentialism, or 
deontologism, appears as “a more helpful approach for robots” 
[28]. We will explore how far this idea goes in the next section. 
3 VIRTUE ROBOTS 
An increasing amount of research has been devoted over the past 
years to the analysis of strong AI systems, trust, and security. 
Consider current work on the verifiability of systems that change 
or improve themselves, or on utility functions or decisions 
processes that aim to avoid that an AI system could try not to be 
shut down or repurposed. Likewise, reflect on further theoretical 
frameworks to better appreciate the space of potential systems that 
avoid undesirable behaviours. At the University of Stanford, an 
area of study has to do with “loss of control of AI systems.” In the 
words of Eric Horvitz, “we could one day lose control of AI 
systems via the rise of superintelligences that do not act in 
accordance with human wishes [so] that such powerful systems 
would threaten humanity” [29]. Similar risks have been stressed by 
Bill Gates, Elon Musk, and Stephen Hawking. How should we 
address these challenges? 
As mentioned above in the previous section, some reckon that 
virtue ethics, rather than utilitarianism, or deontologism, may help 
us tackling the unpredictability and risky behaviour of robots. As 
Abney argues, there are two reasons why this can be the case. First, 
this approach does not hinge on any rule-based morality but rather, 
draws the attention to the context sensitivity of the issues we are 
dealing with, namely, the disposition to act in a certain way under 
certain circumstances. In fact, a “proper functioning approach to 
evaluation appears natural: is the surgical robot operating properly 
in carving one’s chest, or is my new robotic bandsaw 
dysfunctionally attempting to do the same thing?” [28]. Second, 
contrary to the top-down approaches of both deontologism and 
utilitarianism, the approach of virtue ethics is bottom-up and 
involves a trial-and-error learning of what makes the behaviour of 
a robot good, or bad. The “hybrid approach” of virtue ethics seems 
then particularly fruitful to tackle some of the problems with 
robotic behaviour, such as matters of foreseeability and due care 
that may trigger new cases of human negligence. The pragmatic 
and context sensitivity approach of virtue ethics help us indeed to 
determine how we should address the moral dilemmas of robotics, 
how we should program these machines, and test them.  
However, even Abney admits the limits of this search for the 
virtues that properly functioning robots, given their appropriate 
roles, would evince. Simply put, the more societies become 
complex, the less shared virtues are effective, the more we need 
rules on rights and duties. In his words, “as the group of those 
dealing with robots becomes larger and more variegated, social 
sanctions and shared values gradually become less effective at 
minimizing them” [28]. Going back to the Kantian idea that even a 
nation of devils can establish a state of good citizens [10], we 
should thus admit, on the one hand, that even “virtue robots” 
demand rules. Yet, on the other hand, this requirement entails a 
twofold set of further issues. The first problem concerns the 
different moral rules and multiple ways in which we can embed 
such rules into robots. Going back to the state-of-the-art illustrated 
above in the previous section, should we program our robots, 
following a theory of prima facie duties, or the divine-command 
logic? Using deontic logic, or endorsing “principlism”? Should we 
privilege the outcomes of robotic behaviour, or judge them vis-à-
vis the intent behind such actions? A mix of them? 
The second problem revolves around the nature of the rules 
that should govern our robots. Here, we can even assume the ideal 
scenario of scholars that agree on the level of abstraction on what 
is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is bad, about a 
robot’s behaviour. Yet, even in the case of a common ethical code 
under a given moral theory, a number of legal issues are fated to 
remain open. Whereas a set of perfect moral agents, namely a 
bunch of angelic robots, would still need rules to further their 
cooperation and collaboration [11], some of these rules are legal, 
rather than moral. Such rules can be grasped both in the sense of 
Hart’s “secondary rules” that allow the creation, modification, and 
suppression of the primary legal rules on people’s conduct [8], and 
as procedural rules, or of organization. The set of rules on how to 
produce enforceable norms at both national and international 
levels, along with administrative regulation at regional levels, are 
examples of this class of secondary rules of the law.  
However, “virtue robots” also need “primary rules” that govern 
human and robotic behaviour in legal, rather than moral, terms. 
Consider cases of individual responsibility that are under a strain, 
such as immunity for humans bearing responsibility for the care of 
robots and their behaviour in the field of criminal law, or unjust 
damages concerning robots as a source of responsibility for other 
agents in the system [30]. These scenarios appear “hard,” for they 
may spark general disagreement that does not only regard different 
values and principles of the normative context under examination, 
on which social acceptability and cohesion ultimately depend. 
Moreover, these cases require legal expertise to determine whether 
or not a loophole exists in the field, e.g. in criminal law, and hence, 
whether or not new primary rules should be added to the legal 
system. 
In addition, the unpredictability of the actions or behaviour of 
robots, triggers an indefinite kind of cases in which we do not 
know where we may eventually end up. After all, the UK recorded 
77 robot-provoked accidents in 2005 alone in which “people have 
been crushed, hit on the head, welded and even had molten 
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aluminium poured over them by robots” [31]. Likewise, current 
state of the art in technology suggests that the use of, say, 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) should still be conceived as an 
“ultra-hazardous activity,” as much as traditional aviation was 
considered in the 1930s [30]. Leaving aside further robotic 
applications, research and the breath-taking progress in AI and 
robotics then recommend that new levels of risk and 
unpredictability, e.g. cases of loss of control of AI agents, have to 
be taken seriously. How should we legally react before such risks 
and threats? 
4 LAW’S EMPIRE 
The Dworkinian title of this section intends to stress two different 
kinds of legal problem in robotics. They have to do with Hart’s 
“primary legal rules” and their connection with the moral ones 
through the “secondary rules” of the law. Both problems require a 
particular expertise for they regard either the identification of a 
“loophole” in the legal system, or its inner “deadlock.” At times, 
the behaviour of robots may of course trigger legal hard cases that 
bring us back to the current meta-disagreement on the hard cases of 
the law. We mentioned this aspect of the debate above in the 
introduction, e.g. the “uniquely right answer” [32] vs the 
“reasonable compromise”-thesis [8], so as to determine for 
example whether and to what extent lethal force should ever be 
permitted to be fully automated [9].  
Here, the problem is different. It revolves around the ideal 
scenario of scholars that agree on what is right, or wrong, about 
robotic behaviour and yet, even in this case, a further set of issues 
is fated to remain open. These issues concern both the primary and 
secondary legal rules of the system that should govern the 
behaviour of robots, and regard either a basic tenet of the rule of 
law, i.e. the principle of legality, or the unpredictability of robotic 
behaviour. We will analyse the loopholes of the law in Section 4.1, 
and its deadlocks in Section 4.2. Then, the time will be ripe for the 
conclusions of this paper: you do not have to follow the ideas of 
current “exclusive legal positivism,” i.e. the self-referential 
completeness of the law and its sources, to admit that the law has 
some problems of its own, also in the field of robotics.  
4.1 Loopholes 
The first legal problem of robotics is related to a basic tenet of the 
rule of law, that is summarized, in continental Europe, with the 
formula of the principle of legality: “no crime, nor punishment 
without a criminal law.” Whereas certain behaviours might be 
deemed as morally bad, or wrong, individuals can be held 
criminally liable for that behaviour only on the basis of an explicit 
criminal norm. Contrary to the field of civil (as opposed to 
criminal) law, in which analogy often plays a crucial role so as to 
determine individual liability, it is likely that robots will produce a 
novel generation of loopholes in the criminal law field, forcing 
lawmakers to intervene at both national and international levels. 
Robot soldiers are a good example of this first kind of problem, 
e.g. the aforementioned question on whether lethal force should 
ever be permitted to be fully automated. But, consider new forms 
of corporate criminal liability and distributed responsibility that 
hinge on multiple accumulated actions of humans and computers 
[22, 33]. It can be extremely difficult to ascertain what is, or should 
be, the information content of the corporate entity as foundational 
to determining the responsibility of individuals. The intricacy of 
the interaction between humans and computers may lead to cases 
of impunity that have recommended some legal systems to adopt 
forms of criminal accountability of corporations. Think of the 
collective knowledge doctrine, the culpable corporate culture, or 
the reactive corporate fault, as ways to determine the 
blameworthiness of corporations and their autonomous criminal 
liability. Although several critical differences persist between the 
common law and the civil law traditions, and among the legal 
systems of continental Europe, we can leave aside this kind of 
debate, and focus on whether these forms of corporate criminal 
liability could be applied to the case of the artificial legal agents 
and the AI smart machines that are under scrutiny in this paper. 
Noteworthy, over the past years, several scholars have proposed 
new types of accountability for the behaviour of robots [23, 30, 34, 
35, 36, 37], suggesting a fruitful parallelism with those legal 
systems that admit the autonomous criminal responsibility of 
corporations. 
A true story helps us illustrate this new scenario: in May 2014, 
Vital, a robot developed by Aging Analytics UK, was appointed as 
a board member by the Japanese venture capital firm Deep 
Knowledge, in order to predict successful investments. As a press 
released was keen to inform us, Vital was chosen for its ability to 
pick up on market trends “not immediately obvious to humans,” 
regarding decisions on therapies for age-related diseases. Drawing 
on the predictions of the AI machines, such trends of humans 
delegating crucial cognitive tasks to autonomous artificial agents 
will reasonably multiply in the foreseeable future. But, how about 
the wrong evaluation of a robot that leads to a lack of capital 
increase and hence, to the fraudulent bankruptcy of the 
corporation?  
In this latter case, the alternative seems between “crimes of 
negligence” and the hypothesis of AI corporate liability. As to the 
crimes of negligence, liability depends on lack of due care, so that 
a reasonable person fails to guard others against foreseeable harms. 
The latter hinges on the traditional “natural-probable-consequence” 
liability model in criminal law that comprises two different types 
of responsibility. On the one hand, imagine either programmers, or 
manufacturers, or users who intend to commit a crime through their 
robot, but the latter deviates from the plan and commits some other 
offence. On the other hand, think about humans having no intent to 
commit a wrong but who were negligent while designing, 
constructing or using a robot. Although this second type of liability 
is trickier, most legal systems hold humans responsible even when 
they did not aim to commit any offense. In the view of traditional 
legal theory, the alleged novelty of all these cases resembles the 
responsibility of an owner or keeper of an animal “that is either 
known or presumed to be dangerous to mankind” [26]. 
Yet, as to the traditional crime of negligence, there is a 
problem: in the case of the wrong evaluation of the robot that 
eventually leads to the fraudulent bankruptcy of the corporation, 
humans could be held responsible only for the crime of bankruptcy 
triggered by the robot’s evaluation, since the mental element 
requirement of fraud would be missing in the case of the human 
members of the board. Therefore, the criminal liability of the 
corporation and eventually, that of the robot would be the only way 
to charge someone with the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy. This 
scenario however means that most legal systems should amend 
themselves, in order to prosecute either the robot as the criminal 
agent of the corporation, or the corporation as such.  
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Further instances of new robotic offenses can be given. After 
all, we can apply to this context that which James Moor called the 
“logical malleability” of computers and so, of robots. Since the 
latter “can be shaped and molded to do any activity that can be 
characterized in terms of inputs, outputs, and connecting logical 
operations” [38], the only limits to the new scenarios of robotic 
crimes are given by human imagination. It is not so hard to 
envisage a world in which individuals become the innocent agent 
or instrument of an AI’s bad decision. Certainly, by reversing the 
usual perspective, the scenario is not entirely new: we have full 
experience of hackers, viruses or trojan horses, compromising 
computers connected to the internet, so as to use them to perform 
malicious tasks under remote direction, e.g. denial-of-service 
attacks. Yet, what is new in the case of robots concerns their 
particular role of interface between the online and the offline 
worlds. In the internet of everything, we may envisage either 
powerful brain computer interfaces for robots that perceive the 
physiological and mental states of humans through novel 
Electroencephalography (EEG) filters, or robots replicating 
themselves, in order to specialize in infringing practices, so that no 
human could be held responsible for their autonomous harmful 
conduct. Legal systems could react either amending once again 
themselves, e.g. a new kind of autonomous corporate criminal 
liability for robots, or claiming that the principle of legality does 
not apply to smart machines after all. In any event, it is likely that a 
new general type of defence for humans, such as robotic loss of 
self-control, should be taken into account. 
By stressing threats and risks of robotic behaviour, however, 
we should avert a misunderstanding. We are talking about several 
applications that, in the words of the UN World Robotics report 
from 2005, may provide “services useful to the well-being of 
humans” [39]. Therefore, it seems fair to affirm that the aim of the 
law to govern the process of technological innovation, should 
neither hinder it, nor require over-frequent revision to tackle such a 
progress. The analysis of the loopholes of today’s legal systems in 
the field of robotics, introduces the examination of its deadlocks. 
Since robots are here to stay, the aim of the law should be to 
govern our relationships wisely. 
4.2 Deadlocks 
The second legal problem of robotics has to do with the 
unpredictability of the actions or behaviour of robots. From a legal 
viewpoint, the difficulty of the cases does not only regard how we 
should represent the web of concepts, ways of interpretation, and 
principles of the system that are at stake in such cases, through 
notions of agency, accountability, liability, burdens of proofs, 
responsibility, clauses of immunity, or unjust damages. 
Furthermore, legislators can make individuals think twice before 
using or producing robots, through methods of accident control that 
either cut back on the scale of the activity via, e.g., strict liability 
rules, or aim to prevent such activities through the precautionary 
principle [30]. The recent wave of extremely detailed regulations 
on the use of drones by the Italian Civil Aviation Authority, i.e. 
“ENAC,” illustrates this deadlock [40]. How, then, to prevent 
legislations that may hinder the research in robotics? How to deal 
with their peculiar unpredictability and risky behaviour? How 
should we legally regulate the future?  
Admittedly, the legal challenges of robotics vary in accordance 
with the field under examination: international law, criminal law, 
civil law, both in contracts and tort law, administrative law, and so 
forth. Some have proposed that we should register robots just like 
corporations in business law [34, 35, 36]; while others have 
recommended that we should bestow robots with capital [37], or 
that making the financial position of such machines transparent is a 
priority [23]. In the military sector, scholars and UN special 
rapporteurs alike have increasingly stressed over the past years, 
that an international agreement is needed to define the conditions 
of legitimacy for the employment of robot soldiers. The overall 
idea is that a detailed set of parameters, clauses and rules of 
engagement, established by an effective treaty monitoring and 
verification mechanisms, should allow for a determination of the 
locus of political and military decisions that, e.g., the increasing 
complexity of network-centric operations, and the miniaturization 
of lethal machines, can make very difficult to detect [9]. 
Still, in many circumstances and with most of the new 
generation of AI robotic applications, we have a further problem. 
Current default norms of legal responsibility entail a vicious circle, 
since the more the strict liability rules are effective, the less we can 
test our robots. As a result, such primary rules, e.g. the last ENAC 
regulation from December 2015, can indeed hinder research and 
development in the field. Correspondingly, we often lack enough 
data on the probability of events, their consequences and costs, to 
determine the levels of risk and, thus, the amount of insurance 
premiums and further mechanisms, on which new forms of 
accountability for the behaviour of such machines may hinge [30]. 
This lack of data is crucial, because the unpredictable and risky 
behaviour of robots affects traditional tenets of the law, such as 
notions of reasonable foreseeability and due care, on which 
people’s responsibility may depend. A good example is given by 
how a new generation of domestic, or service, robots already 
impact tenets of current legal frameworks in informational privacy 
and data protection [3, 4, 41, 42]. Therefore, how should legal 
systems react? 
Noteworthy, over the past 13 years, the Japanese government 
has worked out a way to address these issues through the creation 
of special zones for robotics empirical testing and development, 
namely, a form of living lab, or Tokku. After the Cabinet Office 
approved the world’s first special zone in November 2003, 
covering the prefecture of Fukuoka and the city of Kitakyushu, 
further special zones have been established in Osaka and Gifu, 
Kanagawa and Tsukuba. The aim is to set up a sort of interface for 
robots and society, in which scientists and common people can test 
whether robots fulfil their task specifications in ways acceptable 
and comfortable to humans, vis-à-vis the uncertainty of machine 
safety and legal liabilities that concern, e.g., the protection for the 
processing of personal data through sensors, GPS, facial 
recognition apps, Wi-Fi, RFID, NFC, or QC code-based 
environment interaction [42]. Significantly, this approach to the 
risks and threats of the human-robot interaction is not only at odds 
with the typical formalistic and at times, pedantic interpretation of 
the law in Japan [43]. It is remarkable that such special zones are 
highly deregulated from a legal point of view. Pace the Italian 
ENAC, “without deregulation, the current overruled Japanese legal 
system will be a major obstacle to the realization of its RT [Robot 
Tokku] business competitiveness as well as the new safety for 
human-robot co-existence” [43].  
So far, the legal issues addressed in the RT special zones 
regard road traffic laws (Fukuoka 2003), radio law (Kansai 2005), 
privacy protection (Kyoto 2008), safety governance and tax 
regulation (Tsukuba 2011), up to road traffic law in highways 
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(Sagami 2013). These experiments should obviously be extended, 
so as to further our understanding of how the future of the human-
robot interaction could turn out. Some examples were illustrated 
above in the previous sections, such as matters of foreseeability 
and due care concerning human negligence, or the unpredictability 
of robotic behaviour that may trigger novel forms of actus reus in 
criminal law. By testing these scenarios in open, unstructured 
environments, the Japanese approach does not only show a 
pragmatic way to tackle the legal challenges of robotics. This sort 
of interface between strong AI robots and human societies, 
between present and future, also allows us to better comprehend 
risks and threats brought on by possible losses of control of AI 
systems, so as to keep the latter in check.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
There are three different ways in which we can grasp the theses 
and title of this paper, “even angels need the rules.” The first way 
directly concerns today’s debate in roboethics. From a moral point 
of view, we can say that even a set of perfect agents, namely a 
bunch of angelic robots, need rules to further their cooperation and 
collaboration. Even advocates of virtue ethics concede this point 
[28]. As illustrated above in Sections 2 and 3, these rules can be 
interpreted either as moral ones [11], or as secondary legal rules 
[8]. 
A second way to interpret the title of the paper involves Hart’s 
primary rules and more particularly, that which Section 4.1 
presented as the loopholes of the law. The legal impact of robotics 
affects all the sectors in the legal field and still, is especially 
relevant in criminal law, where analogy should not help tackling 
the impact of robotics. Although moral theories play a role in this 
context, so as to either find out the uniquely right answer 
(Dworkin), or a reasonable compromise (Hart), moral theories do 
not instruct us as to whether and to what extent we are confronted 
with a legal loophole and hence, whether or not new legal rules 
should be added to the system. This is a question that appears 
crucial for today’s debate on roboethics and still, goes beyond the 
expertise of robo-ethicists. Is there any loophole in the legal 
system? 
The third way to inflect the title regards the unpredictability 
and risky behaviour of robots that have been stressed time and 
again in this paper. Whilst no single moral theory can tackle the 
complexity of the law and instruct us as to how we should legally 
bind our robots, the law itself is confronted with that which Section 
4.2 summed up as the practical and theoretical “deadlocks” of 
today’s legal systems. Lawmakers often make individuals think 
twice before using or producing robots, through methods of 
accident control that either cut back on the scale of the activity, or 
aim to stop these activities at all. Here, what the law adds to the 
current debate in roboethics has to do with the definition of specific 
secondary legal rules that should allow us to understand what kind 
of primary legal rules we may need. The creation of legally de-
regulated, or special, zones for robotics appears a smart way to 
overcome such deadlocks and to further theoretical frameworks 
with which we should better appreciate the space of potential 
systems that avoid undesirable behaviours. By testing the human-
robot interaction outside laboratories, i.e. in open or unstructured 
areas, we can improve our understanding of how these artificial 
agents may react in various contexts and satisfy human needs. 
Also, we can rationally manage the legal aspects of this 
experimentation, covering many potential issues raised by the next-
generation robots and tackling those requirements that often 
represent a formidable obstacle for this kind of research, such as 
public authorisations for security reasons, formal consent for the 
processing and use of personal data, mechanisms of distributing 
risk through insurance models and authentication systems, and the 
like. This is the set of secondary legal rules with which to 
strengthen our comprehension of the type of primary legal rules we 
need in order to govern our robots. At the end of the day, this sort 
of legal de-regulation also offers a fruitful way to deepen our 
understanding of some moral dilemmas in the field. 
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